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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, defendants respectfully submit this petition for
rehearing to raise certain matters defendants believe the
Court's September 6, 1990 Opinion (a copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum "A") overlooked or misapprehended.

These

matters are summarized as follows:
I.

The very first argument raised in defendant's

brief on this appeal was that plaintiffs arguments on the
validity of the jurat in its notice of mechanic's lien were not
timely raised in the District Court, were not considered by the
District Court for that reason, and, therefore, are not properly before this Court.

Yet, the Court's opinion fails to

address whether the issue of the validity of the jurat may be
considered on this appeal.
II.

In ruling that plaintiff's blanket notice of lien

was valid and not misleading or prejudicial to defendants, the
Court overlooked the following points:
A.

As argued in defendants* brief, the work

under the two contracts was started and completed at different
times, with work on the second contract not beginning until
about the time that work under the first contract was completed.

Yet, the notice (sworn to under oath) claimed work

commenced as of the beginning of the first contract and work
was completed at the end of the second cbntract.

As will be

discussed, this defect is important in terms of lien priority,

and timeliness of the filing of the notice of lien and the
lawsuit.
B.

The arguments in defendants' brief on

plaintiffs duty to allocate the amount of its claim among the
various buildings, units and contracts were based on the
prejudice to defendants from plaintiffs failure to allocate in
the notice.

As noted in the Court's opinion, plaintiff cannot

assert its entire claim against each building or unit.
Instead, it must assert a proportionate claim.

From the

notice, none of the defendant lenders could determine what
payment would be required to clear title on individual units
subject to their respective security interests.
III.

The Court's ruling on the statute of limitations

issues raised by Valley Bank means that if a lis pendens is
recorded (or a non-party learns of the action) within the
one-year period prescribed by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 (1953 as
amended), there is no statute of limitations as to joinder of
the non-party defendant.

A lien claimant could file suit

against only one of several persons with an interest in real
property, record the lis pendens, not prosecute the suit, and
cloud the title of the non-parties for years.

This is contrary

to the purposes of the one-year jurisdictional statute of
limitations also found in § 38-1-11.

The statute should be

interpreted to extend the limitation period only if a non-party
acquires a property interest after the lis pendens is recorded
or after learning of the suit.

This is especially true here,

where Valley Bank's security interests were of record at the

time the suit was filed, and no justification was offered by
plaintiff for the failure to join Valley Bank during the
one-year period.
IV.

The Court also overlooked several of defendants*

arguments on the issue of attorneys' fees that will be
discussed below.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT'S OPINION OVERLOOKED THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER THE VALIDITY OF THE JURAT WAS PROPERLY
BEFORE THE COURT.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was heard in
the District Court on March 21, 1986. At the hearing, the
Court granted plaintiff leave to file a memorandum within five
days, addressing the validity of the jurat.
Plaintiff failed to file a memorandum.

R. 683, 698.

Accordingly, on

March 28, 1986, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision
ruling that the jurat, and therefore the notice of lien, were
invalid.

R.684.

On April 9, 1986, defendants mailed a

proposed Order to plaintiffs counsel.

R.702. On April 15,

plaintiff's counsel (Ellen Maycock) withdrew, and on April 16,
new counsel for plaintiff (Robert Babcock) entered his
appearance.

R.692, 695. Nonetheless, no objection was made to

the Order, and it was entered on April 21, 1986. R.698.
Notice of Entry was served by mail on May 6, 1986. R.723.
In the meantime, plaintiff filed a motion to
reconsider on May 1, 1986, arguing for the first time that the
jurat was valid.

R. 704. No reason was given for why

plaintiff failed to file its memorandum in a timely fashion or
why the Court should consider plaintiffs dilatory arguments.
Accordingly, on May 7, 1986, the Court ordered that the motion
to reconsider be stricken, stating that "The Court feels there
is no just cause for bringing such a motion before the Court."
R.726.

Attached hereto as Addendum "B" is a copy of the May 7,

Minute Entry.
All of these facts were set forth in defendants* brief
on this appeal at pp. 9-10 and were the basis for defendants'
first argument at pp. 15-16 that the issue of the validity of
the jurat was not properly part of this appeal. Nonetheless,
this Court's September 6 Opinion fails to mention these facts
and arguments, and defendants must assume they were overlooked.
While Utah civil procedure does not recognize a motion
to reconsider, the District Court has inherent authority to
reconsider a non-final decision, until a final Order is
entered.

See, Salt Lake City Corporation v. James Construc-

tors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 1988).

However, it is

within the District Court's discretion not to entertain a
motion to reconsider, where no proper reason for reconsideration is given.

Id.

Here, the District Court had no power to grant the
motion to reconsider, since a final order, certified pursuant
to Rule 54(b), had been entered ten days earlier.

Moreover,

even if the Court had treated the motion as one for amendment
of judgment under Rule 59(e), the Court still had the discretion not to consider it because it merely raised those

arguments plaintiff had been given the opportunity to make, and
failed to make, several weeks earlier.

It was certainly not an

abuse of discretion for the Court to strike the motion, where
no justification was offered for plaintiffs failure to assert
its arguments in a timely fashion.
Moreover, the fact that the motion was stricken,
rather than merely denied, as well as the Court's explanation
for its ruling in the May 7 Minute Entry, shows that the Court
did not even consider plaintiff's arguments, because they were
not properly before the Court.

Since these arguments were not

properly before the District Court, they are not properly part
of this appeal.

Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83 (Utah 1983)

(reversing lower court on other issues).
In effect, by failing to assert its arguments in a
timely fashion, plaintiff conceded, or waived its right to
contest, the invalidity of the jurat.
II.
THE COURT'S OPINION OVERLOOKED THE MISLEADING AND
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
IN FILING A BLANKET NOTICE OF LIEN.
A.

Effect of the Failure to Allocate Starting and
Completion Dates Between the Separate Contracts.

Plaintiff's Notice of Lien (addendum "A" to
defendants' brief on file) alleged that the first work was
performed on October 10, 1982 and the last work was performed
on October 7, 1983.

However, in discovery, plaintiff admitted

that the work under the second contract (on units 3 through 8
as identified in the Court's opinion) did not begin until
April 23, 1983. R. 467.

Section 38-1-7 as it read at the time of recording of
plaintiff's Notice of Lien (See, Addendum M E" to defendants'
brief on file) required the notice to state the dates upon
which the first and last work were performed (and to give a
description of the contract).

One purpose of these

requirements is to notify those claiming an interest in the
property of the date from which the superpriority given to
mechanic's liens is claimed, i.e., the date work commenced.
The purpose for requiring the date work ceased is so one can
determine whether the notice and any subsequent lawsuit are
timely filed.

Plaintiff's failure to follow these requirements

frustrated these purposes and was misleading and prejudicial.
The work on the first contract was on two different
units (units 1 and 2, as identified in the opinion), which did
not benefit the other units constructed under the second
contract.

See, Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1988).

Accordingly, plaintiff was not entitled to "tack" the priority
of the lien for work done under the second contract to the
priority of lien for the work done under the first contract, as
it attempted to in the Notice of Lien.

Id.

Similarly, units 1 and 2 presumably were completed by
about April 23, 1983, when the work under the second contract
began.

Therefore, the time for filing the Notice of Lien and

commencing a lien foreclosure action on units 1 and 2 began to
run then, not on October 7, 1983, as alleged in the Notice of
Lien.

Accordingly, plaintiff's Notice of Lien recorded on

November 15, 1983 may not have been timely as to units 1 and 2,

since at that time the prime contractor had to record that
notice within 100 days of completion of its work, under
§ 38-1-7.

Also, the March 16, 1984 foreclosure action itself

may not have been brought within the one-year period prescribed
by § 38-1-11/ depending on the exact date upon which units 1
and 2 were completed.
Accordingly, both Valley Bank and Copper State Thrift,
holders of security interests in units 1 and 2, were misled by
the failure of the notice to specify when work under the first
contract was completed.

An interested party ought to be able

to determine statutorily-required facts from the notice (or at
least the fact that there were two contracts with different
starting and completion dates), without being forced to incur
attorneys' fees in discovery to ferret them out, and is
prejudiced by its inability to do so.
B.

Effect of the Failure to Allocate the Amount
of the Claim Among the Separate Contracts
and Units or Buildings.

The provisions of § 38-1-7 in effect at the time of
recording of the Notice of Lien required the notice to include
the amount of the claim.

The obvious purpose of this

requirement is to advise those with interests in the property
of the amount required to release the lien

and clear title.

Defendants submit that this requirement, coupled with the
allocation requirements of § 38-1-8 on separately-owned
buildings, and the allocation requirements of § 57-8-19 on
separate condominium units, required the notice to allocate the
amount of the claim among the separate buildings or units.

Defendants also submit that the Court overlooked the importance
of these requirements where, as here, the work was performed
under different contracts, and there are different defendants
with security interests in the various buildings or units.
At page 16 of its opinion, the Court notes that
although the blanket lien arose prior to recordation of the
condominium declaration (which in turn was recorded prior to
the notice of lien), § 57-8-19 transformed the lien into a
proportionate lien against each unit.

At pp. 16 and 17, the

Court then questions why, on similar facts, court decisions in
another jurisdiction only require the notice to allocate if the
work is done under separate contracts.

Defendants believe

these decisions are sound for the following reasons:
1.

Pursuant to § 57-8-19(2) (and similar condominium

statutes in other states) if several units are built under a
single contract, the amount of the lien claim against each unit
is based upon the percentage interest of that unit set forth in
the condominium declaration.

Because there is a single

contract, each unit owner (or security holder) can determine
the amount of the claim attributable to its unit simply by
applying that percentage to the total amount claimed in the
notice of lien, and there may be no need to allocate.
2.

However, if, as here, some of the units are built

under one contract, some are built under a second contract, and
the notice fails to allocate the amount claimed under each
contract, an owner/security holder cannot determine the amount
of the claim attributable to its individual unit.

This is

because the amounts owed under the two contracts may be (and
probably are) different.

In an extreme case, all of the money

may be owed under one of the contracts, and there would be no
basis at all for clouding the title of the units covered by the
other contract.

While there may be no prejudice, even under

this scenario, if all of the units, or all of the security
interests in those units, are owned by the same party, there is
prejudice where, as here, there is different ownership.

See,

Utah Savings and Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335,
366 P.2d 598 (Utah 1961).

A secured party ought not have to

retain an attorney to conduct discovery simply to determine the
amount of the lien claim attributable to the secured unit,
where the statutes required this amount to be stated in the
Notice of Lien.
C.

Summary of Statutory Defects Attributable to the
Failure of Plaintiff's Notice of Lien to Allocate
Among the Separate Units and Contracts.

At page 5, n.2 of its opinion, the Court stated: "The
Banks do not argue that Projects completely failed to comply
with any of the particular requirements of . . .

§ 38-1-7."

To

the contrary, that is exactly what defendants argued, and
continue to argue here.—'

Plaintiff's failure to allocate

misstated the information sought by most of the statutory
requirements then in effect, including:

1/

It should be noted that plaintiff chose not to address the
merits of its blanket Notice of Lien in either of its
briefs on this appeal.

1.

The amount of the claim as to each unit or

contract;
2.

The terms of the two contracts;

3.

The time when work commenced under the second

contract;
4.

The time when work ended under the first

contract; and
5.

The property subject to the lien.

If only one of these defects existed, perhaps the
Court's ruling would be justified.

Cumulatively, however, they

represent substantial noncompliance with statutory requirements.
At page 7 of its Opinion, the Court defines the substantial
compliance issue as whether the notice "compromised a purpose of
the mechanic's lien statute".

Certainly, the main purpose of the

statute is to provide accurate information from which a property
or security holder can determine the nature of the cloud on its
title.

It is not substantial compliance merely to file a form

containing the statutory elements, where the information provided
is wrong or misleading.

If, as defendants argue, the notice did

not substantially comply with the statute, defendants were
prejudiced by plaintiff's recording of an unjustified cloud on
their security interests.-x

2/

At p. 15, the Court stated that, " . . . the lien is valid,
at least as between the parties to this appeal." This
overlooks that there may be other issues concerning the
validity of the lien that were not raised by defendants'
motions and that should be left for determination on remand.

III.
THE COURT'S OPINION MISAPPREHENDED THE PURPOSES OF THE
JURISDICTIONAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS APPLIED TO
JOINDER OF NEW DEFENDANTS IN A MECHANIC'S LIEN ACTION,
At pages 17-20 of its Opinion, the Court concludes
that the only logical interpretation of § 38-1-11 permits
joinder of any new defendant after expiration of the one-year
limitation period, if a lis pendens was recorded within that
period, or if the newly-added defendant acquired actual
knowledge of the lawsuit within that period.

The Court reasons

that, otherwise, there would be no purpose for the statutory
provisions regarding the lis pendens or actual knowledge of the
lawsuit.

However, this interpretation ignores the distinction

between those who acquire an interest in the liened property
before recording of the lis pendens or learning of the suit and
those who acquire an interest afterwards. This distinction
leads to an interpretation of the statute more persuasive than
that adopted by the Court.
The purpose of a lis pendens is to notify persons who
acquire an interest in the subject property after the recording
of the lis pendens.
(Ariz. App. 1966).

See, Mack v. Augustine, 416 P.2d 436, 443
A lis pendens, or even actual knowledge of

the lawsuit, is meaningless to one who acquires an interest in
property before the lis pendens is recorded, or before learning
of the lawsuit, or, as in the case of Valley Bank, before even
the notice of lien is recorded.

Accordingly, defendants'

suggest that the lis pendens and actual knowledge provisions of
§ 38-1-11 were never intended to apply to those in the position
of Valley Bank.

Instead, the statute should be interpreted as allowing
joinder of a non-party after the one-year period only if that
non-party acquired its interest either after the recording of
the lis pendens or after obtaining actual knowledge of the
lawsuit.

Otherwise, the statute makes no sense.
This interpretation, not the Court's September 6

interpretation, is consistent with both prior Utah law and the
law of other jurisdictions.

At p. 18, n. 13 the Court suggests

that under AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree Development and
Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986), § 38-1-11 is not a
true statute of limitations.

That is correct.

It is more than

a statute of limitations; it is a jurisdictional bar to those
who file tardy claims.

The reason AAA Fencing gives the

statute even greater force than a statute of limitations is to
limit the cloud on title created by a lien that is already
given superpriority.

The Court's present decision here does

just the opposite by extending the cloud on title for no good
reason, especially since Valley Bank's security interests here
were of record at the time the lawsuit was filed.
In reaching its decision in AAA Fencing, this Court
relied on two Colorado decisions, Cox v. Bankers Trust Co., 570
P.2d 6 (Colo. App. 1977) and King v. W. R. Hall Transportation
and Storage Co., 641 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1982) holding that under
the Colorado statute, the lower court had no jurisdiction to
add new defendants after the expiration of the limitation
period.

714 P.2d at 292.

See also, Seafirst Mortgage Corp. v.

Specialty Concrete, 708 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1985); Thompson

Plumbing Company, Inc. v. J.E.C., Inc., 422 N.W.2d 26
(Minn.App, 1988); Hasek v. Terrene Excavators, Inc., 723 P.2d
1153 (Wash. App. 1986).

This Court's September 6 opinion (at

p. 20, n. 15) attempts to distinguish th$ decisions of other
jurisdictions prohibiting joinder of defendants in mechanic's
lien actions after the expiration of the limitation period, on
the basis that their statutes are dissimilar to the Utah
statute.

However, the Colorado statute (a copy of which is

attached hereto as Addendum MC") is also a jurisdictional
statute that requires the recording of a lis pendens.
The interpretation of § 38-1-11 offered by defendants
adequately protects the interests of lien claimants as well.

A

lien claimant can protect itself by a search of the public
records before filing suit or recording the lis pendens, in
order to determine the identities of those claiming an interest
of record in the property, such as Valley Bank, who should be
named as defendants.

If one of those defendants transfers its

interest after the recording of the lis pendens, or to a party
with actual knowledge of the suit, defendants' interpretation
would allow the transferee to be added even after the
limitation period expires.
parties.

This interpretation is fair to all

The Court's September 6 interpretation is not.
IV.
THE COURT'S OPINION OVERLOOKED SEVERAL ISSUES
REGARDING ENTITLEMENT TO ATTORNEYS' FEES TAXED
AS COSTS UNDER § 38-1-18 AND RULE 54(d)(1).
The Court ruled at p. 21, n.18 that Cottonwood Thrift

was not entitled to its attorneys' fees as the prevailing party

under § 38-1-18 because fees were not requested in the motion
for summary judgment*

However, this ruling does not address

the Court's prior decision in Palombi v. D.& C. Builders, 22
Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969), and related cases discussed
at pp. 38-39 of defendants' brief, holding that attorneys' fees
are mandatory under the statute and do not even need to be
requested in the pleadings.

The Court also failed to address

defendants' arguments that § 38-1-18 taxes attorneys' fees as
costs, and that under Rule 54(d)(1) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, costs need not be assessed in favor of the
prevailing party until after appeal.

Defendants certainly were

not required to ask for costs in their summary judgment motion
in order to preserve their right to costs. Moreover, in
defendants' respective answers to plaintiff's Amended
Complaint, all three defendants prayed for both costs and
attorneys' fees.

Accordingly, Cottonwood Thrift is entitled to

its attorneys' fees in the District Court and on this appeal,
as are Valley Bank and/or Copper State Thrift, in the event
they prevail on one or more of the above issues on rehearing.
CONCLUSION
The Court's September 6 Opinion radically liberalizes
Utah mechanic's lien law in a number of significant respects.
However, the Court's analysis overlooked or misapprehended
several important points that should be reconsidered.
Defendants respectfully urge that their Petition for Rehearing
be granted.
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ORME, Court of Appeals Judge:
Projects Unlimited, Inc., appeals from a summary
judgment invalidating its mechanic's lien against the
interests of Copper State Thrift & Loan Comoanv. v 9 n — »-

& Trust Company, and Cottonwood Thrift & Loan Company, Inc.
We affirm the summary judgment as to Cottonwood Thrift, but
reverse as to Copper State and Valley Bank.
I.

FACTS

Bradshaw Development Company, Inc. ("Bradshaw"),
owned a parcel of land, the Highland Orchards property, which
it planned to develop into the Highland Orchards Condominium
project. The property was divided into two parcels with the
objective of constructing condominiums in two phases—phase I
and phase II. Phase I, when completed, would consist of
eighteen condominium units. Bradshaw engaged Projects
Unlimited, Inc. (-Projects"), to construct some of the
phase I units. In September 1982, Bradshaw and Projects
entered into a contract for the construction of two
units—FF-6-A1 and FF-6-B1, hereinafter referred to as
units 1 and 2. Those parties entered into a second contract
in April 1983 concerning the contruction of six additional
units—FF-5-Al, FF-5-B1, FF-11-A1, FF-11-A2, FF-11-B1, and
FF-11-B2, hereinafter referred to as units 3 through 8,
respectively. The contracts allocated prices on a per-unit
basis.
Copper State Thrift & Loan Company financed
construction of the eight units. The Copper State loan to
Bradshaw was secured by two trust deeds. The first deed was
recorded in December 1982 and covered units 1 and 2. The
second deed was recorded in June 1983 and covered units 3
through 8.
Relying on the terms of its loan agreement with
Bradshaw, Copper State refused to advance additional funds to
Bradshaw in June 1983. Sometime thereafter, Bradshaw stopped
making payments to Projects. On October 7, 1983, Projects
ceased construction with a substantial balance still owing to
Projects. Bradshaw did not record its condominium
declaration until August 1983.
During construction, units 1, 2, and 3 were sold.
The sales of units 1 and 2 were financed by Valley Bank &
Trust Company, which recorded trust deeds on those units in
May 1983. Copper State subordinated its December 1982 trust
deed to the May 1983 trust deeds of Valley Bank. The sale of
unit 3 was financed by Western Savings & Loan Company, which
is not a party to this appeal. After construction was
halted, units 4 and 5 were sold. The sales of these units
were financed by Cottonwood Thrift & Loan Company and secured
by trust deeds recorded in December 1983.
In November 1983, Projects recorded a notice of
mechanic's lien against the Highland Orchards property. The
notice described Bradshaw as the owner of the subject
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property- The lien notice described the property by a metes
and bounds description including all of the phase I and
phase II property-1 The notice did not describe the eight
constructed units, by employing their descriptions as used in
the condominium declaration or otherwise, nor did it allocate
unpaid amounts attributable to each unit- The notice did not
distinguish between work performed under the September 1982
and April 1983 contracts. The notice of lien cited the
construction starting date as October 10, 1982, and the
ending date as October 7, 1983. Although the notice of lien
contained the signature and seal of a notary and the date of
notarization, it did not give the notary's address or
commission expiration date.
Bradshaw and Projects negotiated to release from the
lien units 4 and 5, financed by Cottonwood Thrift. The lien
release specifically stated that units 4 and 5 were released
from the scope of the lien in exchange for the payment of
$90,000. Thereafter, Projects filed an amended notice of
lien- The amended notice was essentially identical to the
initial notice except that $85,000 was added to the "credits
and offsets" figure and subtracted from the "balance owing"
figure. The same metes and bounds description was used to
describe the property. The amended notice did not exempt
units 4 and 5 from the property description, but attached to
it were a map of the entire condominium project and a copy of
the partial release.
Projects commenced an action to foreclose the lien
and recorded a lis pendens in March 1984. The complaint
alleged that Bradshaw had breached its contracts with
Projects. The complaint also called for a determination of
priorities among the various claimants. Valley Bank was not
named as a defendant in the complaint but had actual
knowledge of the action at least by August 1984, when it
reviewed a title report showing Projects' lis pendens and
initiated relevant correspondence with Projects. On May 24,
1985, almost twenty months after it ceased construction,
Projects filed an amended complaint which joined Valley Bank
and others as defendants. Bradshaw failed to answer either
complaint, and a default judgment was entered against it in
December 1985.
Copper State, Cottonwood Thrift, Valley Bank, and
Western Savings ("the Banks") moved for summary judgment on
the remaining claims. They collectively argued that
Projects' lien was invalid under the mechanic's lien statute
and under the Condominium Ownership Act. Essentially, their
1. Accordingly, the metes and bounds description was not
confined to the property on which the eight units constructed
by Projects were located. However, it appears from the record
that the only new structures on any part of the Highland
Orchards property were the units constructed by Projects.
3

arguments under the mechanic's lien statute were that
(1) the jurat lacked the notary's address and the date her
commission expired, (2) the notice describes more property
than was actually subject to the lien, (3) the notice
describes property which Bradshaw initially did not own, and
(4) the lien did not distinguish between work performed
under the September 1982 and April 1983 contracts. The
Banks also argued that the Condominium Ownership Act
required Projects to file a separate lien on each
condominium unit as described in the condominium declaration.
Valley Bank also argued that Projects had failed to
join it as a defendant within the statutorily prescribed
time and was therefore barred from later amending its
complaint to add that bank as a defendant. Moreover,
Cottonwood Thrift argued that it was not a proper party to
the suit because Projects had released the units it financed
from the scope of the lien. Projects filed a cross-motion
for partial summary judgment on its claim against Copper
State, its construction lender.
The trial court granted the Banks' summary judgment -*
motions and denied Projects' motion. The court concluded
that (1) Projects had unequivocally released from the lien's
coverage the units financed by Cottonwood Thrift,
(2) Projects failed to join Valley Bank as a party within
the required time, and (3) the lien was invalid due to
improper notarization "and on grounds otherwise set forth in
the moving defendants' memoranda on file."
On appeal, Projects challenges each of the trial
court's conclusions. Primarily, it argues that Utah does
not require a lien notarization to contain the notary's
address and/or commission expiration date.
The Banks assert the same arguments on appeal that
they asserted in the trial court. In particular, they argue
that we should affirm the trial court's decision on the
notarization issue. Moreover, the Banks assert that, even
assuming we were to agree with Projects on the notarization
issue, we can and should affirm the summary judgment due to
other failures in the lien notice. And indeed, "we may
affirm trial court decisions on any proper ground(s),
despite the trial court's having assigned another reason for
its ruling." Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d
892, 895 (Utah 1988); see also State v. One 1979 Pontiac
Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Banks
also cross-appeal, seeking an award of attorney fees in the
district court and on appeal.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

••Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.- Transamerica Cash
Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc.. 789 P.2d 24, 25
(Utah 1990); see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In our determination
of whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment,
we must review the facts in the light most favorable to the
losing party. E,gt, Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc.
v. Blomouist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). Moreover, we
review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness
and give no particular deference to that court's view of the
law. Ifl.
III.

MECHANIC'S LIENS GENERALLY

We begin our analysis by recognizing that "[t]he
purpose of the mechanic's lien act is remedial in nature and
seeks to provide protection to laborers and materialmen who
have added directly to the value of the property of another
by their materials or labor." Calfler grpSt COt Vt Anderson,
652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). On the other hand, we
recognize that liens create "an encumbrance on property that
deprives the owner of his ability to convey clear title and
impairs his credit," First Sec* Mtg, COt vt Hansen, 631 P.2d ^
919, 922 (Utah 1981), a fact the importance of which is
magnified by the pre-recordation priority accorded a valid
mechanic's lien. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (1988). State
legislatures and courts attempt to balance these competing
interests through their mechanic's lien statutes and judicial
interpretations thereof.
Mechanic's liens are purely statutory, and lien
claimants may only acquire a lien by complying with the
statutory provisions authorizing them. Utah Sav. & Loan
Assoc, v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 338, 366 P.2d 598, 600
(1961). However, Utah courts have recognized that
substantial compliance with these provisions is all that is
required.2 Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 295, 296, 215 P.2d
390, 390 (1950); see also Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660
P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1983). Moreover, we have stated that
"[a] lien once acquired by labor performed on a building with
the consent of the owner should not . . • be defeated by
technicalities, when no rights of others are infringed, and
no express command of the statute is disregarded." Eccles
Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 249, 87 P. 713, 716 (1906)
(quoting 20 Am. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law 276); see also
Mickelsen v. Craiqco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1989).
Courts from other states also subscribe to this view. See,
e,qt, H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska, Inc.,
563 P.2d 258, 263 (Alaska 1977); Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co.,
713 P.2d 776, 781 (Wyo. 1986).
2. The Banks do not argue that Projects completely failed to
comply with any of the particular requirements of Utah Code
Ann. § 38-1-7 (1983). Rather, they argue that Projects'
efforts did not substantially comply with!the statutes.
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Although courts have differing opinions about how
liberally to construe provisions within their mechanic's lien
statutes, "the modern trend is to dispense with arbitrary
rules which have no demonstrable value in a particular fact
situation.-3 Consolidated Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Jepson
Elec. Contracting, Inc.. 272 Or. 376, 380, 537 P.2d 80, 83
(1975). Utah has followed this trend both in the legislature
and in the courts. A legislative example of this trend is
the 1985 amendment to section 38-1-7 of the mechanic's lien
statute. The 1985 amendment greatly simplified the
mechanic's lien notice, dispensing with several of the more
cumbersome lien notice requirements.4 One judicial example
of this trend is Mickelsen, in which this court clarified the
lien verification process and dispensed with the notion that
the claimant's verification required any formal ritual. 767
P.2d at 563.
3. This trend is not confined to this area of the law but can
be seen in others as well. See, e.g., Tech-Fluid Servs., Inc.
vt Gavilan Operating, Inc, 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). In Tech-Fluid, the Utah Court of Appeals took a
similar position in the area of redemption. The court
concluded that where the provisions in the redemption statute
are "procedural in nature and do not affect any substantive
rights of the purchaser . . . [substantial] compliance is all
that is necessary." Id. at 1334.
4. The current version of section 38-1-7 provides in
pertinent part:
(2) This notice shall contain a statement
setting forth the following information:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if
known or, if not known, the name of the
record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he
was employed or to whom he furnished the
equipment or material;
(c) the time when the first and last
labor or service was performed or the
first and last equipment or material was
furnished;
(d) a description of the property,
sufficient for identification; and
(e) the signature of the lien
claimant or his authorized agent and an
acknowledgment or certificate . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp. 1990). Requirements under the
1984 version of this provision which are no longer part of the
statute include actual verification of the statements in the
lien notice, "a statement of [the claimant's] demand after
deducting all just credits and offsets . . . [, and] a
statement of the terms, time given and conditions of his
contract . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp. 1983).
No. 860340

6

With these general principles in mind, we turn to
the particular arguments in this case. We must determine
whether the rigorous interpretations ur^ed by the Banks are
necessary to protect the interests of the parties in the
instant situation. Unless we find that Projects' alleged
failures have compromised a purpose of the mechanic's lien
statute, those failures will be viewed $s technical, and in
the absence of any prejudice, we will ubhold the lien.5
IV.

INVALIDITY OF THE LIEN UNDER SECTIONS 38-1-7 AND -8

Sections 38-1-7 and 38-1-8 of 0tah's mechanic's lien
statute identify the statutory elements of a lien notice. At
the time the dispute arose, section 38-^-7 provided that
every notice of lien recorded with the county recorder must
contain
a notice of intention to hold and claim a
lien, and a statement of his demand after
deducting all just credits and offsets,
with the name of the reputed owner if known
or if not known, the name of the record
owner, and also the name of the person by
whom he was employed or to whoni he
furnished the material, with a statement of
the terms, time given and conditions of his
contract, specifying the time when the
first and last labor was performed, or the
first and last material was furbished, and
also a description of the property to be
charged with the lien, sufficient for
identification, which claim must be
verified by the oath of himself or of some
other person.
5. It is important to emphasize the sco^e of this opinion.
Our focus is of course upon the particular parties and
particular facts in this case, but it is further narrowed by
the "as a matter of law" standard implicit in reviewing
summary judgments. It may well be that the same lien notices
would have worked significant prejudice qn other parties not
before us, such as owners of, or lenders secured by, the
phase II parcel to which Projects had no valid claim. Thus it
is entirely possible that we would invalidate this same notice
as it applied to another party who could demonstrate
prejudice. Cf^. Horseshoe Estates v, 2M (fc., 713 P.2d 776, 781
(Wyo. 1986) (holding lien sufficient as against party who
failed to demonstrate prejudice or that it was misled). It is
even conceivable that the Banks, or some of them, could
demonstrate actual prejudice in the context of a trial. At
this juncture, however, we only consider the Banks' contention
that the liens are so flawed as to simply) be void, regardless
of any actual prejudice.
7
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Utah Code Ann, § 38-1-7 (Supp. 1983).6
provided:

Section 38-1-8

Liens against two or more buildings or
other improvements owned by the same person
may be included in one claim; but in such
case the person filing the claim must
designate the amount claimed to be due to
him on each of such buildings or other
improvements.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-8 (1988).
A.

Failure of the Jurat

At the time the dispute arose, Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-1-7 (Supp. 1983) provided that every notice of lien
-must be verified by the oath of [the lien claimant] or of
some other person.- The district court found that a proper
verification under section 38-1-7 required compliance with
Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-8 (1953), which provided: -To all
acknowledgments, oaths, affirmations and instruments of
every kind taken and certified by a notary public he shall
affix to his signature his official title and his place of
residence and the date on which his commission expires.The court then concluded that the notary's failure to
include her address and commission expiration date in the
jurat invalidated the verification, which made the lien
void. We disagree.
Initially, we note that verification is an
essential part of a lien notice and Hnot a hypertechnicality
that we can discount.- First Sec. Mta. Co. v. Hansen, 631
P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1981).' Verification by the lien
claimant was thought necessary so that -[f]rivolous,
unfounded, and inflated claims can thereby be minimized, and
the prejudgment property rights of the [property owners]
receive their due protection.- Jjl. Verification
accomplishes this purpose by creating -the possibility of
perjury prosecution for verifying a false lien claim.H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska. Inc.. 563
P.2d 258, 264 (Alaska 1977) (lien must be signed by
claimant; corporate acknowledgment insufficient).
Although the 1983 mechanic's lien statute requires
verification, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp. 1983), it does
6. Section 38-1-7 has been amended since 1983. See supra
note 4.
7. In First Security Mortgage, a lien notice was held invalid
because the lien claimant failed to sign the oath. The notice
was insufficient even though the notary had signed the
certificate. See also Worthinoton & Kimball Constr. Co. v.
C & A Dev. Co., 777 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989).

not state any particular procedure for verification. Those
procedures have developed judicially in cases like First
Security Mortgage. One of the most recent and instructive
cases defining these procedures is Mickelsen v. Craigco,
IJUL^, 767 P.2d 561 (Utah 1989), decided after the trial court
made its ruling in this case. In Mickelsen, we listed the
essential elements for a proper verification: "(1) [T]here
must be a correct written oath or affirmation, and (2) it
must be signed by the affiant in the presence of a notary or
other person authorized to take oaths, and (3) the latter
must affix a proper jurat.m Id. at 564. The Banks do not
contest that an oath was made or that it was signed before a
notary. They simply argue that the notary failed to affix a
"proper jurat" because she omitted her address and the
expiration date of her commission.
The Banks would have us adopt a position requiring
strict compliance with the notary public statute in order to
satisfy the verification requirement of the mechanic's lien
statute as expounded in Mickelsen. We decline to adopt this
position. A jurat is "merely evidence of the fact that the
oath was properly taken before the duly authorized officer."

50

C.J.S.

Jurat 705 (1947); see also stern vt Poarfl of

Elections, 14 Ohio St. 2d 175, 181, 237 N.E.2d 313, 317
(1968); Craio v. State, 232 Ind. 293, 295, 112 N.E.2d 296,
297 (1953) (purpose is to evidence that oath was made before
authorized officer). In view of this principle, because the
jurat in this case clearly evidenced that the oath was given
before a notary, it should be considered adequate. And even
assuming that the legislature intended the inclusion of a
jurat which conformed with the notary statute,8 substantial
compliance would certainly be sufficient to satisfy that
requirement. E.g., Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 295, 296, 215
P.2d 390, 390 (1950).
In this case, the jurat contained the notary's
signature, the date, and her official seal. These items were
sufficient to evidence the fact that the document had been
verified. Moreover, anyone who questioned the validity of
the notarization could certainly confirm its authenticity
with the simplest inquiry. Thus, we find that the lien's
notarization substantially complied with the mechanic's lien
and notary statutes. See, e.g., Georgia Lumber Co. v.

Harrison Constat C o w 103 w. va. l, 5, 136 S.E. 399, 401
(1927) (notice sufficient though notary failed to affix
official seal in contravention of statute); Stern, 237 N.E.2d
at 317-19 (failure of notary to affix signature to jurat did
not invalidate affidavit).
8. In 1989, the legislature amended the mechanic's lien
statute to specifically provide a particular jurat form. The
current statute requires •'an acknowledgment or certificate as
required under Chapter 3, Title 57." Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-1-7(2)(e) (Supp. 1990).
Q

The purpose of the verification requirement is to
assure that lien claimants file legitimate claims. First
Sec, Mtg,, 631 P.2d at 922; see also H.A.M.S., 563 P.2d at
264• In First Security Mortgage and H.A.M.S., liens were
held invalid because the lien notices did not contain the
signature of the claimants but simply the signature of a
notary attesting to the oath of the claimants. Unlike those
cases, the president of Projects signed an oath that the
contents of the lien notice were true and the notary attested
to this fact. We see no policy reason why the notary's
technical failure to include her address and commission
expiration date increased, in any way, the likelihood that
Projects would file a frivolous claim, especially since her
failure presumably occurred after the verification was signed
by the president.
For the above reasons, we find that the lien notice
substantially complied with the "proper jurat" requirement
established in Mickelsen.9
B.

Other Grounds

Though we disagree with the trial court's legal
conclusion on the notarization issue, we may still affirm the
summary judgment based upon one of the other failures in the
lien notice. The Banks argue that the lien notice is invalid
because the metes and bounds description in the notice
(1) covers more than one condominium unit without
specifically referencing each, (2) describes more property
than is actually subject to the lien, and (3) describes
property which was not initially owned by Bradshaw and
because the notice fails to distinguish between work
completed under the two separate contracts.
These other grounds essentially challenge the
descriptive contents of the lien notice. The purpose for
descriptive terms in a lien notice is to adequately inform
interested parties of the existence and scope of the lien.
&££ Park Citv Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 Utah

145, 155, 103 p. 254, 260 (1906); Eccles Lumber Co, Yt
Martin, 31 Utah 241, 249, 87 P. 713, 717 (1906); see also
Parsons v. Keenev, 98 Conn. 745, 749, 120 A. 505, 507 (1923);
Beall Pipe & Tank Corp. v. Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108
9. We recognize that this conclusion is inconsistent with In
re Williamson, 43 Bankr. 813 (D. Utah 1984), on which the
trial court heavily relied. In Williamson, the bankruptcy
court found that each element listed in section 46-1-8 was an
essential part of a notary's certificate even when made on a
mechanic's lien. Id. at 823. Utah law was admittedly unclear
on this point when Williamson was decided. Nonetheless, we
disagree with the analysis in Williamson and hold to the
contrary.
No. 860340
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Idaho 487, 490, 700 P.2d 109, 112 (Ct. App. 1985);
Consolidated Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Jeoson Elec,
Contracting, Inc., 272 Or. 376, 382, 537 P.2d 80, 82 (1975).
Thus, courts look to see whether interested parties have been
informed of the existence of the lien and whether the lien
has misled or prejudiced those parties. See Eccles, 87 P. at
717; see also Beall, 700 P.2d at 112; Hprseshoe Estates v. 2M
Co., 713 P.2d 776, 781 (Wyo. 1986). When lien notices have
sufficiently informed interested persons that a lien exists
on identifiable property and the complaining party has not
been misled by the notice, the purpose of the provisions has
not been thwarted and courts are inclined to find substantial
compliance. See, e.g., Horseshoe. 713 P.2d at 781.
As we analyze each of the Banks' challenges to the
lien description, our main purpose is to determine whether
the notice adequately informed the Banks of the existence of
the lien and whether the Banks were prejudiced, as a matter
of law, by the descriptive terms. "Absent any such claim of
prejudice or being misled in any manner by the description[s]
which [appear] in the lien statement, we [will] hold that it
was sufficient." Id,.10
-*
1.

Inclusion Of More Than One Unit Without Designating Each

Section 38-1-7 provides, with oiir emphasis, that
every notice of lien must contain "a description of the
property to be charged with the lien, sufficient for
identification." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (Supp. 1983).
Section 38-1-8 provides in pertinent part: "Liens against
two or more buildings . . • owned by the same person or
persons may be included in one claim; but in such case the
person filing the claim must designate therein the amount
claimed to be due to him on each of such buildings." Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-8 (1988). The Banks argue that these two
sections require Projects to allocate its contract claims
among all the relevant condominium unitsJ
We begin our analysis with the first of three cases
dealing with section 38-1-8 and its predecessor. In Eccles
Lumber Co. v. Martin. 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 (1906), the
owner of property on which a mechanic's lien had been filed
argued that a lien notice was invalid because it failed to
separately state amounts due on different structures. This
court construed the predecessor statute to section 38-1-8,
which contains language identical to that in section 38-1-8,
and definitively stated that a blanket lien was not invalid
for failing to allocate the amounts due. Eccles, 87 P. at
10. It is not enough for the Banks to show that other persons
might have been prejudiced by the lien notice. In order to
prevail, the Banks must show that they we^ce somehow misled or
prejudiced. See supra note 5.
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717. The lien claimant's failure did "not affect nor concern
the owner of the property." X&. He. was "fairly informed of
the amount claimed against his property.- ill. Rather,
allocation was necessary "to protect the interests of the
lien claimants between and among themselves." Id.
The next case in which we discussed the issue was
United States Building & Loan Association v. Midvale Home
Finance Corp.. 86 Utah 506, 44 P.2d 1090 (1935). In Midvale
Home, a corporation promoted the construction and sale of
homes in a subdivision. When the corporation defaulted on
its construction loan, the loan company brought suit to
foreclose its mortgage on the subdivision property. We were
called upon to determine the priorities among the mortgage,
several mechanic's liens, and the interests of the individual
home purchasers. The home purchasers argued that they had
priority over the lien claimants because the lien claimants
did not allocate amounts due on the various houses
constructed in the subdivision. The purchasers attempted to
distinguish Eccles on the basis that Eccles involved only the
original owner. We rejected this argument, concluding that
the mechanic's liens "attached before any of the claims of
the unit holders." iiL. at 519, 44 P.2d at 1096.
The final case in which we dealt with this subject
was Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d
335, 366 P.2d 598 (1961). In Mecham, a claimant filed a lien
covering numerous subdivision lots. Some of the lots were
owned by the Mechams, and some, by another individual. The
lien failed to allocate the amounts due on each lot. Mecham
argued that the lien was invalid. We affirmed the general
rules in Eccles and Midvale Home but concluded that the lien
claimant could only aggregate claims if the various lots and
structures described in the lien were owned by the same
person.
As in Midvale Home, the Banks in this case acquired
their interests in the property subsequent to the time the
mechanic's lien attached. Unlike the situation in the Mecham
case, Bradshaw was apparently the only owner of the affected
property when the lien attached, i.e., when construction
started. Finally, the Banks do not argue that the lien
misled them as to the claimed lien, nor have they
demonstrated any prejudice from the aggregation of the claims
in this case. Thus, we hold that the lien notice was not
invalid, at least as against the Banks, simply because
Projects failed to segregate the contract amounts
attributable to individual condominium units.
2.

Describing More Property Than Was Subject To Lien

The Banks argue that even if Projects was not
required to segregate the claims attributable to each
No. 860340
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condominium unit, the lien was invalid tor describing more
property than was properly subject to the lien. However, the
general rule is that the inclusion of
more land than that to which the lien may
properly attach does not vitiate the lien
upon so much of the land as is encompassed
within the description and to which a lien
may properly attach, at least if the
description is not fraudulent or grossly
misleading and innocent third parties are
not affected.
Annotation, Sufficiency of notice, claim, or statement of
Mechanic's lien with respect to description or location of
real property, 52 A.L.R.2d 12, 83 (1957); see also Adams Tree
Serv., Inc. v. Transamerica Title Ins. go., 20 Ariz. App.
214, 511 P.2d 658, 663 (1973) (valid portion of lien can be
severed from invalid portion); Beall Pipe & Tank Corp. v.
Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 700 P.2d 109, 112
(Ct. App. 1985) ("the land properly subject to the lien is
for the court to determine"); Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock
Silver Mining Co.. 36 Utah 145, 103 P. 254, 259 (1909)
("court may limit the amount [of land] to what may be
necessary-); Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co., 713 P.2d at 781
(lien which contained "no adequate description of the
property- upheld where no claim of prejudice or being
misled); Enole v. First Nat'l Bank. 590 P.2d 826, 832 (Wyo.
1979) (validating lien which described entire ranch rather
than small parcel upon which house was c0nstructed since no
showing of prejudice by bank).
We are persuaded that no purpose of the mechanic's
lien statute would be served by totally invalidating a lien
which overdescribes the property upon which the lien can
properly attach. There is no evidence in the record to
suggest that the description was fraudulent. Moreover, the
Banks do not argue that they were misled or prejudiced by the
description. Therefore, we cannot say, as a matter of law,
that the overly broad description results in the lien's
invalidity as to the Banks.^

11. At the risk of unnecessary repetition, we reiterate that
in holding that the description does not invalidate the lien
as to the Banks, we do not mean to suggest that the result
would be the same for others. The lien, for example, is
ineffective as to the phase II property, in which the Banks
claim no interest, and inclusion of that property in the lien
notices would subject Projects to appropriate relief in a
slander of title action. See supra note 5.
13

No. 860340

3.

Describing Property Not Initially Owngfl Bv Bradshaw

The Banks argue that the description may have
included property not even owned by Bradshaw at the time the
work was commenced on the project. They argue, citing
Mecham, that this fact alone invalidates the lien. We do not
think Mecham stands for this proposition. In Mecham, we
invalidated the lien because "the materials, for which claim
was made, were not furnished upon buildings owned by the same
person or persons.- 12 Utah 2d at 339, 366 P.2d at 601
(emphasis added). Here, the Banks do not argue that any of
the materials or labor went into the construction of
buildings not initially owned by Bradshaw but simply that
some of the land included in the notice was not owned by
Bradshaw at the outset of construction.
We fail to see much of a distinction for this case
between a lien which includes too much property owned by the
same owner and too much property part of which is owned by
another person. In either event, the court can determine
what part of the property is actually subject to the lien.

3eall Pipe & Tank CorPt vf Tumac Intermovmtaini Inct, 108
Idaho at 498, 700 P.2d at 112. Whether the other person
would have an action for slander of title is a separate
matter. See supra note 11. Again, the Banks do not complain
that they were actually misled or prejudiced by the notice.
Thus, under these facts, the overly expansive property
description did not compromise any purpose of the statute and
does not invalidate the lien as to the Banks.
4.

Inclusion Of Separate Contracts In One Lien

The Banks also argue that the lien must fail because
the construction work on the property was performed under two
separate contracts. Although the Banks advance this
argument, they fail to cite much authority to support their
position or to give any policy reasons for adopting such a
rule. Utah courts have not addressed this question before,
and there is a split of authority among other jurisdictions
which have considered it.
Some courts have held that when work is performed
under separate contracts, the work may not be aggregated into
a single lien claim. Rather, a separate notice must be
recorded for each contract. See, e.g., F.A. Drew Glass Co.
v. Eagle Mill. 1 Kan. App. 614, 42 P. 387, 390 (1895);
Schivelv v. Radell, 227 Pa. 434, 441, 76 A. 209, 211 (1910).
Other jurisdictions, however, have allowed lien claimants to
file a single notice even though the work was performed under
more than one contract. See, e.g., Fixture & Plumbing Co..
131 Ala. 256, 31 So. 26, 28 (1901); Alabama State Fair &

Agricultural Ass'n v> Alabama Gas Booth v, Pendola, 88 cal.
36, 25 P. 1101, 1101 (1891); Parsons v. Keenev, 98 Conn. 745,
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749, 120 A. 505, 507 (1923); Saint Joseph's College v.
Morrison. Inc., 158 Ind. App. 272, 302 N.E.2d 865, 874-76
(1973); Consolidated Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. Jenson Elec.
Contracting, Inc., 272 Or, 376, 537 P.2d 80 (1975); Fischer
v. Meiroff, 192 Wis- 482, 484, 213 N.W. 283, 285 (1927),
After reviewing the various cases, we find more
persuasive the cases which have allowed the aggregation of
claims arising under more than one contract. In Consolidated
Electric, one of the comparatively more recent cases, the
Oregon Supreme Court allowed a lien claimant to file a single
lien notice covering two contracts with separate owners.
Although the court stated that it did not favor the practice,
it noted that each owner was sufficiently notified of the
lien against its property and no "prejudice [had] been
suffered by the defendants in any material respect." 272 Or.
at 383, 537 P.2d at 83. The holding of Consolidated Electric
significantly departed from earlier Oregon case law. See,
e.g., Dimitre Elec. Co. v. Paget, 175 Or. 72, 151 P.2d 630
(1944). In changing its position, the Oregon court
recognized that "the modern trend [in mechanic's lien law] is
to dispense with arbitrary rules which h$ve no demonstrable
value in a particular fact situation." Consolidated Elec.
Dist., Inc., 272 Or. at 380, 537 P.2d at 82.
The reasoning in Consolidated Electric makes sense,
and we adopt that position in this case. Again, the Banks do
not argue that the notice failed to adequately notify them of
the existence of the lien or in any way prejudiced them.
Thus, we hold that the inclusion of claims arising under two
separate contracts in a single lien notice did not invalidate
Projects' lien.
5.

Synunary

The Banks do not seriously claim that any of the
alleged description failures misled or prejudiced them. The
lien notices, while not a model of clarity and precision,
appear to have adequately^ accomplished the purposes of the
statute as concerns the Banks. Thus, we hold that Projects'
lien notice substantially complied with sections 38-1-7 and
38-1-8 of the mechanic's lien statute. Accordingly, the lien
is valid, at least as between the parties to this appeal.
V.

INVALIDITY OF THE LIEN UNDER SECTION 57-8-19

The Banks also argue that the lien notice was
invalid under the Condominium Ownership Act, which provides
in pertinent part, with our emphasis:
Subseouent to recording the declaration as
provided in this act, and while the
property remains subject to this act, n&
15

lien shall thereafter arise or be
effective against the property. During
such period liens or encumbrances shall
arise or be created only against each unit
« . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-19 (1953)• The Banks argue that
Projects' lien arose and was effective only after
recordation of the condominium declaration. Thus, they
argue, Projects was required to file a notice of lien for
each specific condominium unit.
Utah appellate courts have not had an opportunity
to interpret section 57-8-19 in this context. However, both
the Montana and Wisconsin Supreme Courts have interpreted
statutes nearly identical to Utah's in contexts similar to
this case. See Hostetter v. Inland Dev. Corp., 172 Mont.
167, 561 P.2d 1323 (1977); Stevens Constr. Corp. v. Draper
Hall, Inc., 73 Wis. 2d 104, 242 N.W.2d 893 (1976).
The facts in Hostetter. Stevens, and the instant
case are essentially the same. In each case, the developer
contracted for the construction of condominium units and
construction work began. Thereafter, the developers filed
condominium declarations. Some time later, the contractors
filed mechanic's liens which described the entire property
on which the condominium complex was constructed and failed
to allocate separate amounts to the different units. In
each case, the defendants argued that a blanket lien over
the entire project was inappropriate once the condominium
declaration had been filed.
The courts in both Hostetter and Stevens held that
the blanket lien was sufficient. Hostetter, 172 Mont, at
173, 561 P.2d at 1326-27; Stevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114, 242
N.W.2d at 898. Both courts noted that the key factor was
the point when the liens arose and became effective against
the property; both courts held that this occurred at the
commencement of construction. Hostetter, 172 Mont, at
172-73, 561 P.2d at 1326; Stevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114, 242
N.W.2d at 898. The filing of the lien notice merely
preserved and perfected the lien. Stevens, 73 Wis. 2d at
114, 242 N.W.2d at 898. The only effect that the
condominium declaration had was to make the blanket lien
proportionately effective against each unit constructed
under the subject contract along with its corresponding
undivided interest in the common area. Hostetter, 172 Mont,
at 174, 561 P.2d at 1327; Stevens, 73 Wis. 2d at 114, 242
N.W.2d at 898.
The Banks attempt to distinguish Hostetter and
Stevens. They note that, unlike this case, the work in
those cases was done under a single contract. They argue
No. 860340
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that this fact alone should produce a different result, but
they do not state the reasons for their conclusion. We have
concluded that a lien notice may include work performed under
separate contracts and fail to see why the result should be
different when the work is performed on a condominium
project.12
We find the reasoning in Hostetter and Stevens sound
and adopt their rationale. Section 57-8-19 does not affect
the validity of the lien in this case. The lien arose and
became effective when Projects commenced work on the
project. As previously noted, the lien notice was sufficient
to perfect that lien, making the lien valid at least as to
the units properly subject to the lien and as between the
parties to this appeal. The only effect of section 57-8-19
and the intermediate filing of the declaration was to make
the lien proportionately effective against each unit
constructed under the subject contracts and each such unit's
corresponding undivided interest in the common area. Having
concluded that the lien notice is not facially invalid as to
the Banks, we turn now to the separate arguments presented by
Valley Bank and Cottonwood Thrift.
-,
VI.

VALLEY BANK DISMISSAL

The trial court granted summary judgment to Valley
Bank on the basis of Utah Code Ann. § 38+1-11 (1988). That
statute provides in pertinent part:
Actions to enforce [mechanic's] liens must
be begun within twelve months after the
completion of the original contract, or the
suspension of work thereunder for a period
of thirty days. Within the twelve months
herein mentioned the lien claimant shall
file for record with the county recorder of
each county in which the lien is recorded a
notice of the pendency of the action, in
the manner provided in actions affecting
the title or right to possession of real
property, or the lien shall be void,
12. In Hostetter, the Montana court specifically noted that
the blanket lien was effective against the entire condominium
project because "the work was performed under one contract,
and not a series of separate contracts for each unit."
Hostetter v. Inland Dev. Corp., 172 Mont. 167, 170, 561 P.2d
1323, 1325 (1977). Apparently, Montana courts have adopted
the position that a single lien may not encompass work
performed under multiple contracts. See Caird Ena'g Works v.
Seven-up Gold Mining Co., Ill Mont. 471, 487-89, 111 P.2d 267,
276 (1941). We have declined to adopt that position and thus
disavow that aspect of the Hostetter decision.
17
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except as to persons who have been made
parties to the action and persons having
actual knowledge of the commencement of
the action . . . .

Projects commenced this action and recorded its
lis pendens five months after it ceased construction, well
within the statutory twelve-month period. It did not,
however, add Valley Bank as a defendant until it filed its
amended complaint, nearly twenty months after construction
ceased. Valley Bank argued, and the trial court agreed, that
section 38-1-11 is a statute of limitation13 which required
Projects to name Valley Bank as a defendant within the
twelve-month period, on pain of its action against Valley
Bank being forever barred. We read section 38-1-11
differently.
Section 38-1-11 has two requirements which serve two
different purposes. First, the statute requires the lien
claimant to commence his action within twelve months of the
completion of the project or suspension of work. See supra
note 13. Valley Bank argues that the lien claimant is also
required by this provision to join all persons having an
interest in the property within the twelve-month period.
However, the statute does not expressly require the lien
claimant to do so and, on the contrary as hereafter
explained, obviously contemplates the joinder of defendants
not initially named after the expiration of the twelve-month
period.
The second "requirement" of section 38-1-11 is that
the lien claimant file a lis pendens within the twelve-month
period. However, the limited effect of a failure to comply
with this requirement is expressly set forth in the statute.
When a claimant fails to file the lis pendens within the
13. Although both parties have characterized section 38-1-11
as a statute of limitation, we do not view it strictly as
such. Rather, it contains one of the requirements with which
the claimant must comply ••before [that] party is entitled to
the benefits created by the [mechanic's lien] statute.- AAA
Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291
(Utah 1986). The penalty for not commencing an action to
enforce a mechanic's lien within the twelve-month period
provided in section 38-1-11 is invalidation of the lien rather
than preclusion of the claim as with a traditional statute of
limitation. Seq. e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (Supp.
1986). The commencement requirement of section 38-1-11 serves
as a substantive restriction on the lien action and, unlike a
true statute of limitation, is not waived if not pleaded.
AAA, 714 P.2d at 291.
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twelve-month period, the lien itself is ^iot invalidated, but
rather it is rendered void as to everyonte except those named
in the action and those with actual knowledge of the
action. By contrast, it follows logically, timely
recordation of the lis pendens imparts constructive notice
to all persons concerned with the property of the action to
enforce the lien, see Utah Code Ann. § 70-40-2(1989),
regardless of whether they were named as parties or had
actual knowledge of the action.
Valley Bank's contrary interpretation would render
portions of the statute meaningless or nonsensical. See
Millett v* C U E k Clinic Corp,, 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)
("[S]tatutory enactments are to be so coristrued as to render
all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and that
interpretations are to be avoided which rfender some part of
a provision nonsensical or absurd."). For one thing, it
would be pointless to provide that a lien would be valid as
against persons with actual knowledge of the action to
enforce the lien who had not been named as parties in the
action as filed within the twelve-month period unless it
were fully anticipated that such parties could be brought
into the action, by amendment, beyond the twelve-month
period. It would make no sense to consider the lien to be
valid as against such persons unless it cpuld be enforced
against them by joining them in the action as previously
commenced. Moreover, failure to join a defendant in the
complaint as filed within the twelve-month period cannot be
conclusively fatal to the claimant's ability to enforce the
lien as against the defendant or it would be meaningless for
the statute to refer to the continued effectiveness of the
lien, even absent timely recordation of a lis pendens, as
against nonparties, like Valley Bank in this case, who have
actual knowledge of the action.
We conclude that section 38-1-11 should be read as
a whole to require a lien claimant to continence a mechanic's
lien action and record a corresponding lis pendens within
the twelve-month period. Commencing the action preserves
the lien. Recording the lis pendens impacts constructive
notice of the lien enforcement action to Everyone interested
in the liened property. Only when the claimant fails to
timely record the lis pendens can an interested person argue
that it is not subject to the lien, and tfyen only if such
person was not named as a party and did nc^t have actual
knowledge of the action.
In this case, Projects commenced the action and
filed the lis pendens within the required twelve-month
period. Valley Bank was therefore subject to the lien14
14. It is worth noting that even if Projects had not recorded
its lis pendens timely, Valley Bank would still be subject to
(Continued on page 20.)

and could properly be joined by an appropriate amendment to
the complaint as was done in this case. The trial court
accordingly erred when it dismissed Valley Bank from the
action,15
VII.

AMBIGUITY OF "PARTIAL- LIEN RELEASE

The trial court granted Cottonwood Thrift & Loan
Company's summary judgment motion on two grounds: First, the
court concluded that, "based on undisputed facts," Cottonwood
Thrift had reasonably relied upon the recorded lien release.
Second, the court concluded that the effect of the release
was clear on its face. Projects agues on appeal that the
release was ambiguous. It also argues that reasonable
reliance is a concept necessarily too fact-sensitive for
disposition by summary judgment.
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of

law.

E t g T / Morris v. Mountain States Telt & Telt Co f / 658

P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983). Moreover, the trial court must
determine •'whether a contract is ambiguous . . . before it
takes any evidence in clarification." Xfl. It follows,
therefore, that if the contract is clear on its face, the
trial court need not—and in fact should not—consider
evidence of a contrary meaning.
The release in this case stated in pertinent part
that Projects "in consideration of [$90,000] . . . does
hereby release, satisfy and discharge that certain claim of
lien . . . against the following described real property."
The release then described units 4 and 5. This language is
susceptible of no other interpretation but that the two units
(Footnote 14 continued.)
the lien because it had actual knowledge of Projects' action
by no later than August 1984, when it reviewed a title report
disclosing the action and commenced a dialogue with Projects
concerning the matter.
15. Although Valley Bank directs our attention to California
and Illinois decisions holding that a lien claimant may in no
event add defendants after expiration of the dealine for
filing a mechanic's lien action, we are not persuaded by those
decisions. As previously noted, unlike California and
Illinois statutes, section 38-1-11 is not a true statute of
limitation. See supra note 13. Moreover, our statute is
significantly different from the statutes in California and
Illinois because it does not merely impose a dealine for
commencement of the action, but goes on to delineate persons
who will be subject to the lien even though not joined in the
action within the twelve-month period. Our attention is drawn
to no decision construing similar language in any other
mechanic's lien statute.
No. 860340
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were completely released from the scope of the lien,16 The
trial court properly construed the release as a matter of law
and properly declined to consider evidence of another
intent• Consequently/ we affirm the trial court's decision
to dismiss Cottonwood Thrift from the action,17
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The trial court's order and judgment of dismissal
are affirmed only as they relate to Cottonwood Thrift.18
As to Copper State and Valley Bank/ we reverse and remand for
trial or other appropriate proceedings consistent with this
decision.

16. Projects argues that the release was ambiguous because
the word "Partial" was added to the "Release of Lien"
heading. However, in the context of this case, the release
clearly was "partial" because it only released two of the
eight units otherwise covered by the lien notice. We do not
believe that the addition created any ambiguity in the
instrument.
In the determination of the real character
of a contract/ courts will always look to
its purpose rather than to the name given
it by the parties, and where a conflict
exists between a name attempted to be
applied to a particular contract and the
language of the contract itself/ the name
will be rejected as inapplicable.
17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 269 (1964) (footnote omitted).
17. Because we agree that the release was clear and was not
ambiguous/ we need not address Projects' reasonable reliance
arguments.
18. The Banks request on appeal that we award attorney fees
based upon Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1988)/ which provides:
"In any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter
the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court/ which shall be taxed
as costs in the action." In view of our holding/ except as
concerns Cottonwood Thrift, determination of any party's
"success" is clearly premature. In the case of Cottonwood
Thrift/ we note that it, along with the other banks, did not
request attorney fees as part of its motion for summary
judgment. We will not entertain issues raised for the first
time on appeal. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title
Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651/ 657 (Utah 1988). Therefore, we
decline to consider Cottonwood Thrift's request for fees even
though it has successfully defeated Projects' claims against
it.
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